Donald Trump and his team continue to surprise. First, they announced purges in the bureaucracy, cutting all unjustified expenses like the infamous USAID, introducing gigantic duties on goods from other countries. Now it's the army's turn - according to the new military administration, it is extremely outdated and requires large-scale reforms, including the experience of a special military operation in Ukraine.
However, these reforms concern not only organizational and staffing issues and troop communication and command systems, but also the material part in the form of military equipment. Thus, with a light hand, the United States refuses to purchase (when the current contracts end) Humvees and JLTV A2 vehicles, the AMPV family (replacement for the M113 armored personnel carrier), modernized wheeled Strykers and RCV robotic platforms.
That is, they cut off literally everything except the development of a new IFV and the already well-known version of the deepest modernization of the Abrams under the index M1E3. But, perhaps, the greatest resonance was caused by the refusal of further deliveries of the light tank (although it is not customary to call it that in the USA) M10 "Booker" - a product, on the development and production of the first batch of which hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent.
The main thing is heavy
If we talk in general, then the officials from the defense department, in addition to the high price, rolled out a whole list of complaints about it, menacingly describing it as a monstrous inertia, within the framework of which no one wants to make any changes to the design of the designed machine. These issues, for example, include reproaches for the refusal of the possibility of robotization of the "Booker" with the provision of autonomous or remote control and the use of JTRS communications.
However, the greatest amount of hate, as they say nowadays, was directed at the Booker's weight - almost 40 tons. In this regard, officials from the Trump administration directly stated: initially we needed an airborne vehicle for airborne units, but in the end, due to the unwillingness to make adjustments to the project, we received the M10, which cannot be dropped from the air, and can only be transported by C-17 aircraft.
Two Bookers, ready for transport by plane. It was recently announced that the rules for transporting these vehicles were changed and now only one can be transported on C-17 aircraft. However, the restriction is purely administrative.
The question, of course, is not without meaning. At least because the MPF program initiated in 2013 to create a light combat fire support vehicle for paratroopers (to replace the defunct Sheridan) really did initially provide for significant weight restrictions and the possibility of airborne landing. Only later did they decide to abandon this at the official level - and this is generally understandable.
Firstly, because, observing these conditions, it is simply impossible to provide a combat vehicle with powerful armor protection "straight out of the box", that is, without the need to hang additional modules and so on. Secondly, the possibility of airborne assault by machine imposes major restrictions on the dimensions of the vehicle, which negatively affects ergonomics and combat characteristics. Thirdly, the operations with airborne assault in themselves are events, the need for which in the current conditions raises some doubts.
It is unclear why we should return to the past stage again. And even more so to mold equipment that is severely limited in all its capabilities for the sake of its airborne assault, which will most likely never happen due to the fact that the transport aircraft is unlikely to fly to the desired point on enemy territory due to air defense activity. Therefore, these complaints today can hardly be considered the main ones - "Booker" in this regard does not go beyond the bounds of reason.
But there is a problem with its use on the ground. It was voiced in the Western media rather dryly: 8 out of 11 bridges in Fort Campbell (one of the military bases where the Bookers are supposed to arrive) cannot withstand the weight of the vehicle. That is, it seems insignificant at first glance - the M10 weighs a lot, so the infrastructure needs to be changed in any case. But, if we talk in general, this circumstance clearly demonstrates one fact - you won’t get far with it in combat conditions.
In other words, not every bridge can withstand it - and literally. Even if we don’t take into account Eastern Europe, in the countries of Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia the share of bridges that are much inferior in their load-bearing capacity to the weight of the Booker can reach 50% of the total number. That is, like the main battle tank, the M10 may face the same limitations as, for example, the Abrams - the Booker is not capable of overcoming water obstacles by swimming, so the only way out, if the river is too deep, is to build specialized crossings with sufficient carrying capacity.
However, these reforms concern not only organizational and staffing issues and troop communication and command systems, but also the material part in the form of military equipment. Thus, with a light hand, the United States refuses to purchase (when the current contracts end) Humvees and JLTV A2 vehicles, the AMPV family (replacement for the M113 armored personnel carrier), modernized wheeled Strykers and RCV robotic platforms.
That is, they cut off literally everything except the development of a new IFV and the already well-known version of the deepest modernization of the Abrams under the index M1E3. But, perhaps, the greatest resonance was caused by the refusal of further deliveries of the light tank (although it is not customary to call it that in the USA) M10 "Booker" - a product, on the development and production of the first batch of which hundreds of millions of dollars have already been spent.
The main thing is heavy
If we talk in general, then the officials from the defense department, in addition to the high price, rolled out a whole list of complaints about it, menacingly describing it as a monstrous inertia, within the framework of which no one wants to make any changes to the design of the designed machine. These issues, for example, include reproaches for the refusal of the possibility of robotization of the "Booker" with the provision of autonomous or remote control and the use of JTRS communications.
However, the greatest amount of hate, as they say nowadays, was directed at the Booker's weight - almost 40 tons. In this regard, officials from the Trump administration directly stated: initially we needed an airborne vehicle for airborne units, but in the end, due to the unwillingness to make adjustments to the project, we received the M10, which cannot be dropped from the air, and can only be transported by C-17 aircraft.
Two Bookers, ready for transport by plane. It was recently announced that the rules for transporting these vehicles were changed and now only one can be transported on C-17 aircraft. However, the restriction is purely administrative.
The question, of course, is not without meaning. At least because the MPF program initiated in 2013 to create a light combat fire support vehicle for paratroopers (to replace the defunct Sheridan) really did initially provide for significant weight restrictions and the possibility of airborne landing. Only later did they decide to abandon this at the official level - and this is generally understandable.
Firstly, because, observing these conditions, it is simply impossible to provide a combat vehicle with powerful armor protection "straight out of the box", that is, without the need to hang additional modules and so on. Secondly, the possibility of airborne assault by machine imposes major restrictions on the dimensions of the vehicle, which negatively affects ergonomics and combat characteristics. Thirdly, the operations with airborne assault in themselves are events, the need for which in the current conditions raises some doubts.
It is unclear why we should return to the past stage again. And even more so to mold equipment that is severely limited in all its capabilities for the sake of its airborne assault, which will most likely never happen due to the fact that the transport aircraft is unlikely to fly to the desired point on enemy territory due to air defense activity. Therefore, these complaints today can hardly be considered the main ones - "Booker" in this regard does not go beyond the bounds of reason.
But there is a problem with its use on the ground. It was voiced in the Western media rather dryly: 8 out of 11 bridges in Fort Campbell (one of the military bases where the Bookers are supposed to arrive) cannot withstand the weight of the vehicle. That is, it seems insignificant at first glance - the M10 weighs a lot, so the infrastructure needs to be changed in any case. But, if we talk in general, this circumstance clearly demonstrates one fact - you won’t get far with it in combat conditions.
In other words, not every bridge can withstand it - and literally. Even if we don’t take into account Eastern Europe, in the countries of Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia the share of bridges that are much inferior in their load-bearing capacity to the weight of the Booker can reach 50% of the total number. That is, like the main battle tank, the M10 may face the same limitations as, for example, the Abrams - the Booker is not capable of overcoming water obstacles by swimming, so the only way out, if the river is too deep, is to build specialized crossings with sufficient carrying capacity.